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In June 1987 the Canadian government announced plans to procure 10 to
12 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). The evidence suggests that, for some
Canadians, a primary purpose for this submarine program may not be to
enhance the security of NATO, but instead to assert Canada's sovereignty,
principally against the United States, in the Arctic region. The thesis
discusses this decision and its possible implications for the security of North
America and NATO. It is argued that the United States must continue to
have unimpeded access to the Arctic region to counter the ever increasing
threat posed by Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Finally,
the thesis suggests a possible solution to the current sovereignty debate and a
potential strategy for employing these SSNs to enhance the security of North
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the Canadian navy has followed the path of a roller
coaster in its development. From 1910 until most recently, Canadians have
historically allowed the world's menacing situations to dictate the course in
which their naval development proceeded. The primary reason for the seesaw
tendency in Canada's naval development is that Canadians have not chosen
to allocate the necessary resources to provide for sustained naval prepared-
ness. As a result, there has been very little consistence during the Royal
Canadian Navy's existence.
This inconsistency in the Royal Canadian Navy's preparedness, coupled
with the multilateral and bilateral agreements entered into during and after
World War II, has had the effect of creating a commitment-capability gap
within Canada's foreign policy. Today, not only is Canada's navy incapable of
providing for the security of its 44,000 mile coastline, (but depending on the
demands of specific military contingencies) it may also be incapable of making
any enduring contribution to the Atlantic Alliance.
In June 1987, after almost 40 years of maintaining modest naval
capabilities, the Canadian government announced its plans to procure 10 to
12 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). This announcement was in part predi-
cated upon Canada's decision to strengthen its naval capacity. However, the
evidence suggests that for some Canadians a primary purpose for this sub-
marine program may not be to enhance the security of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), but instead to assert Canada's sovereignty in
the Arctic region, principally against the United States. This renewed
emphasis upon sovereignty appears to be a response to the United States'
refusal to recognize the waters of the Arctic archipelago as Canada's inland
waters. This nonrecognition and the reported use of these waters by U.S. fast
attack submarines has produced a flurry of protests throughout Canada.
There are some questions as to whether Canada can legally claim
sovereignty over the region; nevertheless, the sovereignty issue has become a
problem in the close U.S.-Canadian defense relationship, which was inaugu-
rated during World War II. Since World War II, Canada and the United
States have cooperated on numerous defense-related issues. This close rela-
tionship has been based upon their mutual objective of providing for the
security of North America. One of the more notable U.S.-Canadian defense
cooperation efforts originated in the creation of the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD) in 1958. The two governments agreed to provide
jointly for the air security of North America. (The organization was subse-
quently renamed the North American Aerospace Defense Command.) In view
of the United States' and Canada's shared interests and history of close co-
operation, it is hard to see how the sovereignty issue could lead to a truly
fundamental rift between these two friendly governments.
Since the Soviets first developed the ballistic missile submarine in 1955,
*
the importance of the Arctic region for the security of North America has
steadily increased. This region is home to the powerful Soviet Northern Fleet,
second in size only to the Pacific Fleet. One of the main strategic problems
posed by the Northern Fleet is that its SSBNs, from concealed hiding places
under the Arctic ice, possess the capability of striking any point in North
1James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment, and
Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 199.
America without any warning prior to launch detection. Also, in a conven-
tional war, the Northern Fleet possesses numerous assets that could operate
against the important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between North
America and Europe.
In view of the threat posed by Soviet SSBNs and other assets of the
Northern Fleet, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to have unimpeded
access to the Arctic region.
This thesis discusses Canada's decision to procure SSNs and the possible
implications of this decision for the security of North America and NATO.
While it is not suggested that 10 to 12 Canadian SSNs could or would be used
to physically deny U.S. submarines access to the Arctic archipelago, the
Canadian government has stated that during peacetime these submarines
would be used to identify foreign submarines entering the region. If a foreign
submarine was identified, the Canadian government would then lodge a
formal protest with the country in question. 2 As harmless as these proposed
actions may appear, they could potentially have a twofold adverse impact
upon NATO. First, the proposed Canadian policy could compromise the
discreet nature of U.S. submarine operations in the Arctic. Second, it could
have a detrimental impact upon Alliance cohesion. In view of these
considerations and the ever increasing threat of Soviet nuclear ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs), it is argued that the U.S. must continue to have
unhampered access to the Arctic region.
2David R. Francis, "Canada to Join World's Exclusive Nuclear-Sub Club," The Christian
Science Monitor, 3 June 1987, 10.
Chapter II examines past roles and missions of the Royal Canadian Navy
in order to identify some possible answers as to what factors have contributed
to the navy's current posture. The proposed naval revitalization plan is so
unusual for Canada during peace time that it leads one to speculate about the
origins of the plan. Chapter III deals with this issue by looking at Canada's
current defense objectives and the role the proposed SSNs will play in accom-
plishing these objectives. In addition, this chapter explores the origin of the
sovereignty dispute between the United States and Canada and reviews other
current issues. Chapter IV discusses some of the pertinent issues (e.g., cost
and source) surrounding the acquisition of the SSNs. Because one of the
stated missions of the proposed submarines is to assert Canada's sovereignty
in the Arctic archipelago, Chapter V assesses the significance of this region in
terms of the security challenges it poses for North America. An assessment of
U.S. and Soviet interests in the Arctic region is undertaken. In view of the
apparent conflict between U.S. interests and some of Canada's sovereignty
claims, Chapter VI attempts to determine how Canada's prospective SSN
assets might be best employed in enhancing the defensive capabilities of
North America and NATO,thereby frustrating the Soviets' chances of being
the victors in any potential dispute.
II. CANADA AS A NAVAL POWER
A- HISTORICAL ROLE
Although Canada borders three oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic),
possesses the world's longest coast line (44,000 miles), and relies heavily upon
seaborne trade, Canada does not have a long tradition as a naval power. As a
matter of fact, the Royal Canadian Navy was not founded until 1910—forty
years after confederation. Prior to this time, Canadians felt little or no need to
raise a navy. In part, the decision to forgo the development of a navy was the
result of Canada's exclusive reliance upon the British Royal Navy (RN), which
at the time had unquestioned supremacy of the seas, to provide for their
maritime security.3
1. Development
Serious consideration for the development of the Canadian Navy did
not begin until 1909, when Germany began to intensify its military build-up
in Europe. As a result of this German threat, the Canadian leadership began
to raise questions about the fate of Canada if Great Britain were to lose its
supremacy of the seas. Obviously, the Canadian leadership did not think that
the prospects for Canada would be very positive if this were to occur, because
it prompted the Parliament to "cordially approve of any necessary expendi-
ture designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service
^Joseph Schull, The Far Distant Ships, (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press,
1988), 3.
in cooperation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy."4 As a result of
the Parliament's action, a bill was ultimately passed, in 1910, that estab-
lished the Naval Service, Naval Board, and a Naval College. The following
year, the King designated Canada's infant navy the Royal Canadian Navy
(RCN).5
At the time of the navy's inception, a building program was devised
for the construction of five cruisers and six destroyers. In the meanwhile, two
RN cruisers were purchased to serve until the new ships could be constructed
and pressed into service. However, the building program did not proceed very
far before a fierce dispute arose over whether or not British dreadnoughts
should be purchased instead of initiating Canada's own building program.
The very language of the earlier Parliament's resolution "...in cooperation
with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy," served as the underpinning
for this dispute. The end result of this embroilment was that the entire pro-
curement program was placed aside. To make matters worse, the two cruisers
that were previously obtained from the British were later deactivated. Hence,
the Canadian navy remained without ships until the start of World War I and
at a total strength of 366 officers and men.6
2. Role in World War I
When war finally erupted in Europe in 1914, Canada reactivated the
two cruisers previously obtained from Great Britain. The only other assets




trawlers and other small craft. Early in the war and without proper
authorization, the Premier of British Columbia took it upon himself to pur-
chase two submarines from a shipyard in Seattle. These meager naval assets
limited the Royal Canadian Navy's role in World War I to that of performing
only coastal minesweeping, coastal antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and coastal
patrols along the Canadian coast.
At the height of the war, the RCN's personnel end strength reached
six thousand; nevertheless, shortly after the war's end, demobilization
occurred, as it did with other allied countries, and the RCN was reduced to
three ships and 366 men. This drastic demobilization was predicated upon a
growing isolationist attitude, a very low perception of threat to Canada's
shores, and a consideration for Canada's growing debt problems.
An isolationist mentality began to pervade Canada during the war.
Canada's entry into the war was the result of constitutional arrangements
with Great Britain that bound Canada to come to the empire's defense. More
than 600,000 Canadians went to war, serving in either the British or
Canadian armed forces; and some 60,000 of these men lost their lives. 7 Such a
huge loss in a war that Canada had obviously had no control over declaring
made some Canadians start to distance themselves from Great Britain and
turn their allegiance inward toward Canada as a nation. This new identifica-
tion was enhanced by the:
...masses of young Canadians [who] were exposed to the British in the army
[and navy] whose social structure was based on the class consciousness of
7David P. Burke, The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: The Politics OfDefense
in the Pearson Administration, (PH.D. diss., Harvard University, 1975), 54.
Edwardian England. The experience persuaded a generation of English
Canadians that whatever they were, they certainly weren't British. 8
The Treaty of Versailles codified Canada's isolationist sentiments, for Canada
signed this war-ending treaty separately and not as a dominion subject to
Great Britain.
With the Central Powers defeated and with many commentators
fostering the belief that the war just concluded would rid the world of the
need to fight any future wars, the Canadian leadership did not see any poten-
tial threat to their country's security. As R.H. Roy points out:
The United States, fighting with the allies since 1917, was no longer
regarded as a potential threat to Canada's sovereignty. With a friendly
neighbor to the south, the wide oceans to the west and east, and the frozen
tundra to the north, in a world dominated by friends, Canada seemed
secure. Under the circumstances why maintain any of the services?9
Canada's feeling of security was further reinforced by the trust placed
in the League of Nations as an arbitrator of disputes between nations and the
non-aggression treaties among the Great Powers. It was believed that
"...intelligent men would never permit such a holocaust as 1914-1918 to be
repeated."10
Aside from the human cost, the war had placed a tremendous finan-
cial burden upon Canada, leaving it with many debts. This was another dom-
inant factor contributing to Canada's rapid demobilization.
8Ibid., 55.
9Hector J. Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, (Canada: Copp Clark Publishing
Company, 1972.), 37
10Ibid., 40
Great Britain, recognizing the precarious situation in which drastic
reduction had placed the RCN, gave Canada a cruiser, two destroyers, and
two submarines. However, this was to no avail, because by 1922 Canada's
continued indifference toward the military in this era of isolationist sentiment
(and the general feeling of security) led to the sale of the cruiser and the two
submarines. Thus Canada was left with only two destroyers for maritime
defense. 11
During the entire decade of the 1920s, only $2,000,000 was appropri-
ated to the navy. 12 The neglect of the RCN's capabilities continued until 1936,
when a sparse building program was finally initiated and several other assets
were obtained from the Royal Navy, bringing the total naval force to six
destroyers and eight minesweepers. Accompanying this modest RCN hard-
ware build-up, personnel levels were also increased to slightly more than
3,000. 13
3. Role in World War II
Canada entered World War II on September 10,1939. In contrast with
its relatively minor role in World War I, the Canadian navy was to assume a
major role in the Second World War. The RCN was assigned primary respon-
sibilities in protecting supply convoys from North America against German
U-boat attacks in the Atlantic. For the accomplishment of this mission, the
RCN required many more ships than it had on hand at the beginning of the
war. Since British shipyards were overwhelmed with the construction of ships
11Schull, The Far Distant Ships, 5-7.
12Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, 41.
13Schull, The Far Distant Ships, 7.
9
to meet the Royal Navy's needs and U.S. shipyards were not prepared to pro-
vide the quantity of ships needed, the Canadians were forced to build
shipyards and construct their own naval vessels. As a result, the Canadians
began constructing a type of whaling ship later called a Corvette. These were
small, fast, and highly maneuverable vessels that proved highly effective in
the RCN's escort and ASW missions. 14
Throughout the war, the Royal Canadian Navy performed its mission
admirably. It was engaged in extensive campaigns in the Mediterranean,
Arctic, Gulf of St. Lawrence, English Channel, North Sea, and even the
Pacific. By 1943, the navy had grown to include approximately 400 warships,
making it a formidable naval force. At the close ofWorld War II, the Royal
Canadian Navy ranked third in the Western world, behind only the United
States and Great Britain.
The RCN's combined wartime efforts accounted for the sinking of 27
German U-boats and the capture or destruction of some 42 enemy surface
ships. 15
B. CANADA'S NAVY IN THE POST WAR ERA
For many of the same reasons that demobilization occurred after World
War I, Canada again demobilized its armed forces. Although the reductions
were considerable, they were not as drastic as those after the previous war.
Its navy, which had consisted of 80,000 members at its peak, was reduced to a




Canadian Navy with only an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and a few smaller
combatants. 16
This demobilization was probably predicated upon "an overwhelming
desire on the part of publics and policy-makers alike to return as quickly as
possible to the normalities of peace." 17 Moreover, Prime Minister Mackenzie
King, a Liberal, rejected any notion of Canada serving collectively with the
Commonwealth in supporting British foreign and defense policy during the
post-war period. 18
D. Stairs describes the general feelings that prevailed throughout Canada
following the end of the war.
With the enemy thoroughly dispatched, and with the victorious great
powers committed to continuing their wartime co-operation into the post-war
period, there appeared initially to be little in the way of "external menace"
against which a significant defence capability might have to be maintained.
The principal substantive objectives of foreign policy related primarily to
the regeneration of normal patterns of international trade, partly through the
reconstruction of war-damaged economies in Europe, and partly through the
maintenance of international monetary stability, and neither of these
required a military instrument.
So far as the "diplomatic support" functions were concerned, it was clear
that such military-based influence as Canada might hope to wield had
16Ibid., 430-31.
17Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, 92.
18Burke, The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, 71.
11
already been acquired as a result of the Canadian contribution to the conduct
of the war, and that of substantial armed forces. 19
Probably the most significant aim of Canada's defense policy was to
maintain continued cooperation with the United States.20
The war had substantially damaged the United Kingdom's economy and
reduced its military might. The Canadian leadership knew that they could no
longer rely upon Great Britain to provide for Canada's security. Therefore,
they prudently realigned Canada's defense relationships with the United
States, which had emerged by war's end as the leading economic and military
power in the world. This new defense partnership was confirmed in a number
of bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements immediately following
World War II. The partnership in defense had begun with the Ogdensburg
agreement, entered into with the U.S. in 1940. In this pact, it was agreed that
the two governments would provide for the joint defense of North America
during World War II.
With the perception of no external threat, little need of a military for
diplomacy, and a friendly relationship with the world's most powerful
country, a large military establishment would ( it seemed) serve no useful
purpose. As a result of this perceived secure situation, military expenditures
"by fiscal year 1947-48 had dropped to a mere $195,000,000 from a wartime
peak of $2,963,000,000."21 Thus Canada began its slow descent to a secondary
level of strength in a world that had become bipolar.
19D. Stairs cited in Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, 93.
20Burke, The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, 71.
21Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, 94.
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1. Mission
Canada's enthusiasm for collective security continued after the war,
when it assumed a decisive role in advocating the creation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).22 Although its military forces had been
drastically reduced, Canada still possessed a substantial military capacity
relative to its European NATO allies. But more importantly, because Canada
was not subjected directly to the ravages of war, its economic infrastructure
was left intact. These two combined factors enabled Canada to exert an
unaccustomed influence in the development ofNATO. Canada readily
assumed the role of a major power in leadership; but, as Byers points out, "By
all of the traditional indicators—manpower, equipment, and defense spend-
ing...Canada is not, and never has been, a major military power within the
Western Alliance."23 Despite its middle power status, Canada's assertiveness
in the formulation of NATO led to its assuming commitments that approach
those of a major power.24
Similarly, Canada's zeal for collective security was extended to North
America in the establishment of the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD), entered into with the United States in 1958.25 In this agreement,
22Jon RMclin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1967), 12-13.
23R. B. Byers, Adelphi Papers 214: Canadian Security and Defense: the Legacy and the
Challenges, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.), 10.
24Ibid.
2
*Willis C. Armstrong, Louise S. Armstrong, and Francis 0. Wilcox, Canada and the
United States: Dependence and Divergence, (New York: University Press of America, 1986),
224.
13
the two governments subscribed to build a radar network for early warning
and to pool their air resources in the defense of North America against Soviet
attacks.
As a result of these collective defense agreements and in providing for
Canada's own defense, the Canadian Armed forces are charged with four
principal responsibilities:
• to contribute to the collective defense ofNATO;
• to defend the North American continent in cooperation with the
United States;
• to contribute to international peacekeeping;
• to protect and enhance Canada's sovereignty and independence.26
2. Ability to Accomplish Mission
In order to meet its primary NATO objectives during a time of crisis,
Canada's Maritime Command (MARCOM, the successor to the RCN) is com-
mitted to providing the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)
with 15 frigates/destroyers, 26 Sea King helicopters, three submarines, and
14 Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft.27 These naval assets are
earmarked for use in keeping open the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
between North America and Europe. However, given Canada's current force
levels (Table 2.1), ifMARCOM was called upon to provide these assets,
Canada would be left with only eight frigates/destroyers, nine Sea king heli-
copters, no submarines, and four Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft
to patrol its 44,000 mile coastline.
26Byers, Adelphi Papers 214: Canadian Security and Defense, 6.
27Ibid., 7.
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Moreover, because of their age, many of the assets, if called upon,
could only make a limited contribution to SACLANT.29 For example, the
three British-built Oberon-class submarines that Canada currently operates
2°Byers, Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A
Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Center, 1987) 30. This
publication is commonly referred to as the White Paper and it will be referred to as such for
the remainder of this thesis.
29Byers, Adelphi Papers 214: Canadian Security and Defense, 7.
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were purchased during the 1960s. During the 1990s, each of these sub-
marines will attain the age of 30. Moreover, because of technological
advances, these submarines have become obsolete in such rudimentary
features as their underwater speeds, snorkeling requirements, diving depths,
noise signatures and sensor capabilities. Furthermore, they are incapable of
operating under the Arctic ice, an area that has recently become a central
preoccupation of Canada's defense community. These combined shortcomings
of the Oberons could make them inadequate should the need arise for their
service.30
As far as the second principal responsibility is concerned, Canada and
the United States have entered into some 200 bilateral agreements for the
defense of North America, the most notable of which is NORAD. Because the
perceived threat to North America during the 1970s came from Soviet SLBMs
and ICBMs, both the U.S. and Canada somewhat neglected their responsi-
bilities to this air defense organization during that period. However, with the
Soviet deployment of advanced long-range Air Launched Cruise Missiles
(ALCMs), commitment to this organization has been renewed.31 In March of
1985, Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan met in Quebec City to
reaffirm their continued commitment to this organization. In view of the
threat posed by Soviet ALCMs, it was later agreed in 1986 to construct the
30Canada. Department of National Defence, Backgrounder Documentation: Canadian
Submarine Acquisition Project, 1987, 1.
31Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States: Dependence and
Divergence, 236.
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North Warning System (NWS) to replace the aging Distant Early Warning
System (DEW).32
But as cooperative as the two governments appear in this joint
venture, their relationship has been strained because of Canada's limited
contribution. Currently, Canada provides only 10 percent of the cost of
NORAD. Canadians have maintained that, since their population is only 10
percent of the total United States' population, Ottawa is contributing its fair
share to NORAD. Needless to say, the U.S. does not agree with this
contention.33
Since 1947, Canada has made a substantial contribution to its third
principal defense goal, peacekeeping operations throughout the world. In
August 1988, Canadians were among the first forces to arrive for peace-
keeping duties in the Persian Gulf; however, those forces had to be trans-
ported by the U.S. Air Force. Peacekeeping operations have been considered
desirable by many Canadians because of their relatively low cost and high
moral appeal.
The fourth principal responsibility of the Canadian armed forces
—
defending national sovereignty—has been a recurring theme throughout most
of Canada's history. Chapter III provides an extensive review of this issue.
Jean Blais, former Minister of National Defense, reached the follow-
ing conclusions about Canada's military preparedness:
If a major national crisis were to occur, the Canadian Forces could not
make a credible contribution to deterrence; and in the event of hostilities,
32Byers, Adelphi Papers 214: Canadian Security and Defense, 8.
33Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States: Dependence and
Divergence, 238.
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the Canadian Forces would not be sufficiently manned or equipped to carry
out the tasks expected of them in support of the Allied effort and conse-
quently would be overly vulnerable to enemy attack.34
A former United States Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, has stated
that: "...as it is, Canada is not adequately able to defend the St. Lawrence
river, let alone the entire territory of the world's second largest country."35
These judgements from both within and outside Canada leave little doubt
that a "commitment-capability gap" exists within Canada's foreign policy.
Thompson has described this phenomenon as follows:
The commitment-capability gap demonstrated not only the relatively
low priority of defense spending in Canada, but the political and symbolic
character of its efforts. Some exasperated critics have asked Canada to shift
its focus from merely seeking influence at diplomatic council tables to
defense for the sake of defense which would redraw Canada's commitments
to conform to its capabilities.36
Canada's foreign policy efforts have dictated that Canada maintain a
strong defensive posture; however, Canada's defense expenditures have not
supported the country's foreign policy presumptions.
Canada's historically low levels of defense expenditures have contin-
ued to widen the commitment-capability gap. It is obvious that in order to
meet military commitments a country must allocate the necessary level of
resources for the procurement of vital equipment. Moreover, national security
priorities and military commitments should set the direction which military
34Jean Jacques Blais cited in Byers, Adelphi Papers 214: Canadian Security and
Defense, 11.
35Paul Robinson cited in Wayne C. Thompson, "Canadian Defense Policy," Current
History, (March 1988) 105.
36Ibid., 108.
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expenditures should take, and their relationship should be directly propor-
tionate. In other words, as commitments increase, so should capabilities;
however, the reverse has occurred in Canada.37
According to one estimate, since 1974 Canada's military expendi-
tures, as a percent of total government expenditures (MECGE) have ranged
between a low of 7.7 to a high of 8.7 percent of total government expenditures.
(See Appendix A.) During this same time frame, total government expendi-
tures in current dollars (CGECUR) have increased more than four-fold.
According to another estimate, that portion of government expenditures
allocated to military expenditure has actually declined from 12 to 9 percent.38
In addition, Canada's military expenditures have been further diluted by an
average annual 8.5 percent inflation rate.39 Figure 2.1 depicts this relation-
ship between military expenditures as a percent of total government expendi-
tures (MECGE) and total government expenditures in current dollars
(CGECON).
Canada's level of military investment may be placed in perspective
with a comparison to other NATO members of a similar economic level. (See
Appendix B.) During the period 1967-1983, on the average, the United States
spend about 25% of its national budget on defense, United Kingdom 12%,
West Germany 11%, and France 9.8%.
^Byers, Adelphi 214: Canadian Security and Defence, 31.
38Ibid., 87.



















Figure 2.1. The Relationship Between MECGE and CGECON.40
Another unfavorable measurement of Canada's military expenditures
is the percentage of its gross domestic product allocated to the military. As
Figure 2.2 describes, this declining percent ofGDP dedicated to defense has
resulted in Canada being ranked 14th among the 16 NATO countries in mili-
tary expenditures, only above tiny Luxembourg and Iceland, and Iceland has
no military forces.
40The data used in this chart was extracted from the program 'USACDA WMEAT DATA
1967-1983.' Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 3033/4381. This data was extracted from the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's yearly publication, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers.
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Figure 2.2. NATO'S Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP.41
The consequences of Canada's defense spending pattern have been fourfold:
...first, the commitment-capability gap has emerged as a major defence
problem; second, Canada's military reliability within the Western Alliance
has been called into question; third, in the mid-1980s the Canadian Forces
lack the capabilities to make a positive and credible contribution to conven-
tional deterrence (and, more importantly, should deterrence fail, would be
unable to perform their assigned roles and missions adequately); and fourth,
defence procurement has been adversely affected by nondefence consider-
ations related to industrial benefits and regional economic development.42
Probably one of the principal factors contributing to Canada's flag-
ging military posture has been the public's unwillingness to allocate the
necessary resources to the armed forces in times other than war. As a result,
Canadian politicians have come to place a high degree of emphasis upon
41Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence
Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987), 47.
42Byers, Adelphi 214: Canadian Security and Defence, 31.
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diplomacy. The stress on diplomacy has a strong moral appeal among the
Canadian citizenry and enables politicians to divert resources to non-military
demands for government spending.
The neglect of the armed forces has resulted in Canada, a first world
country by all economic standards, becoming a secondary military power.
Canada cannot meet its defense commitments nor can it adequately provide
for its own security.
In view of its historically low levels of military expenditures, a con-
vincing argument could be made that Canada has used its close proximity to
the United States as a means of providing for its security. That is, because of
the common borders shared with the U.S., an aggressor could not attack
Canada without contemplating a response from the U.S. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely that the U.S. would sit idly by and let this occur. Therefore,
Canada has been afforded the luxury of this "trump card" as a means of low-
ering its defense burden. While the U.S. is probably well aware of this situa-
tion, it cannot threaten to decouple its defense commitment, as in the case of
European members of the Atlantic Alliance, owing to Canada's "cheap ride"
on U.S. defense forces, because the security of Canada is central to the secu-
rity of the continental United States.43
43Thompson, "Canadian Defense Policy," 105.
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III. CANADA'S DECISION TO MODERNIZE ITS NAVY
It became increasingly apparent in the early 1960s that Canada's contri-
butions to the collective security of NATO and North America had begun to
decline. This decline was precipitated when Canada's defense expenditures
plummeted from, "a high of $1,802 million [Canadian] (in 1956) [to] a low of
$1,546 million (in I960)."44 As a result of this roughly $256 million dollar
reduction in military expenditures, adjustments had to be made in Canada's
military capabilities. The accompanying force reductions led to the realization
by the early 1960s that Canada could make only a meager contribution to the
defense of North America and NATO.
Canada's limited ability to contribute to collective security had the effect
of eroding "...the consensus upon which Canadian defence policy had been
based..., and the importance of its role in facilitating the pursuit of Canada's
interests in world affairs was called into question."45 Factions within the
government began to question the wisdom in expanding Canada's military
capabilities during a time of no anticipated menace.46
The Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker, who was in power from 1957 through 1963, proved incapable of
shifting the opinion trends back in favor of a credible defense. As a result, the
Liberals were able to capitalize on this opportunity in the elections of 1962
and 1963 and to bring to power Lester Pearson, as Prime Minister. Pearson's




solution to this growing division within the government was the 1964 White
Paper. In this defense posture paper, the Prime Minister reaffirmed Canada's
commitment to collective security; however, he made no mention of what
Canada's contribution would be in the face of its dwindling resources.47 This
evidence suggests that Pearson was attempting to appease both the Liberal
and Conservative factions within the country.
The objectives of Canada's defense forces as outlined in the White Paper
were:
• To preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to
deter military aggression
• To support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of. .
.
participation in international organizations
• To provide for the protection and surveillance of [Canadian]
...territory, ...air-space,...and coastal waters."48
In accomplishing these objectives the White Paper stated that, "...it is
essential that a nation's diplomacy be backed up by adequate and flexible
military forces to permit participation in collective security and peacekeeping,
and to be ready for crises should they arise."49 With regard to the protection
of Canada, it was stated that:
...for the foreseeable future, [it is] impossible to conceive of any significant
external threat to Canada which is not also a threat to North America as a
whole. It is equally inconceivable that, in resisting clear and unequivocal
47 Ibid.
48Honourable Paul Hellyer, and Honourable Lucien Cardin, White Paper on Defence,
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1964), 5.
49Ibid., 11.
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aggression against Canadian territory, Canada could not rely on the active
support of the United States.50
The net effect of these assertions was probably to add to the already
growing ambivalence among the Canadian citizenry. Here, on the one hand, it
was implied that Canada would meet its NORAD, NATO, and United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping commitments. On the other hand, Canada more or less
assumed that the protection of its sovereign territory could be left to the
United States. The 1964 White Paper marked the beginning of an era of
erosion in Canada's defense polices.
In 1968 when Pierre Trudeau, a Liberal, came to power, he was immedi-
ately faced with resolving the debate over Canada's defense roles and
missions in view of its decreasing capabilities. As a result of the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) being expelled from Egypt in 1967, Prime
Minister Trudeau immediately rejected the peacekeeping role outlined for
Canada in the 1964 White Paper. Instead he called for making Canada and
Canadian sovereignty the central focus of Canada's defense and foreign
policies.51
Trudeau immediately made decisions that were to affect Canada's NATO
commitments, NORAD commitments, and defense spending policies. First, he
announced that Canada would reduce its forces in Western Europe by 50
percent. Second, the decision was made that Canada would not participate
50Ibid., 13.
^Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States: Dependence and
Divergence, 229.
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with the U.S. in any active missile defense system in North America. Finally,
the defense budget was frozen at $1.8 billion (Canadian) for three years.52
These announced changes were not readily apparent in the 1971 White
Paper, where the objectives were outlined as:
• The surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines, i.e. the
protection of our sovereignty;
• The defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. forces;
• The fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and
• The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we [the
Canadians] may from time to time assume.53
In reviewing the the objectives set forth in the 1971 White Paper it is is
apparent that:
The real function of the White Paper therefore was not so much to
announce major modifications in the substantive activities of the Canadian
armed forces, as to equip them with a new rationale falling more appropri-
ately in line with their eroded dimension.54
Comparing the defense objectives of the 1964 White Paper with those of
the 1971 it is readily apparent that there was a fundamental change in
defense policy. While the 1964 White Paper is also considered a Liberal docu-
ment, in practice though not completely in principle, it did not totally disre-
gard the concerns of the Conservatives. Trudeau, on the other hand, did not
attempt to co-opt the Conservative faction in the 1971 White Paper, which
52ibid.
53Donald S. MacDonald, Defence in the 70s, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971), 16.
54Massey, The Canadian Military: A Profile, 109.
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can be described as uniquely Liberal. For example, the number one priority in
the 1964 White Paper was collective security, but sovereignty assumed this
position in 1971. Moreover, only a conditional commitment was made to
NATO's collective security, and it was given the third position following the
cooperative defense of North America.
The 1971 White Paper clearly demonstrated Canada's retrenchment from
world politics. This was in part the result of the administration's highly opti-
mistic perception of changing world affairs. According to the 1971 White
Paper:
The most significant changes on the international scene with consequences
for Canadian defence policy have occurred in the nature of the strategic
nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the
state of East-West political relations both in Europe and directly between
the two super-powers. These changes, together with the emergence of China
as a nuclear power and the growing economic strength of Europe and Japan,
have resulted in a loosening of the bipolar international system. This trend
is emphasized by the announcement that President Nixon of the United
States will shortly be visiting the Peoples' Republic of China, indicative of a
major change in policy for both countries. On the other hand, the prospects
for effective international peacekeeping, which were viewed with some
optimism in 1964, have not developed as had been hoped.55
Under Trudeau's leadership, Canada's military capabilities continued to
erode until 1975, when Minister of Defence James Richardson, in a speech,
called for Canada to take a more active role in NATO. This speech clearly
indicated a change in the policies established in Trudeau's 1971 White Paper.
The three factors that significantly contributed to this announced policy
change were Canadian press criticism of Trudeau's defense policies, the sug-
gestion of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that Canada should
55MacDonald, Defence in the 70s, 1.
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place a greater priority upon NATO than NORAD, and the Canadian Defence
Structure Review (DSR).56 The review was an acknowledgement by the
Liberals that Canada's military capability had eroded to dangerously low
levels. As a result of the DSR, defense funding was to increase and modest
capital improvements were to be initiated.Specifically, the DSR indexed the
defense budget to the rate of inflation and called for increasing capital expen-
ditures from 11 percent to 23 percent.57 However, this level ofgrowth in
capital expenditures was not realized until fiscal year 1982-83.58
Since that time, it is pointed out in the 1987 White Paper that:
...more money has been spent on the purchase of equipment...nevertheless,
even this funding is insufficient to overcome the *bow wave' of deferred
equipment acquisition built up since the 1960s. If this condition were allow-
ed to continue unaltered, it would soon lead to "rust-out", the unplanned
and pervasive deterioration in the military capabilities of the Canadian
Forces. Eventually our [Canada's] commitments could not be safely main-
tained and, finally, even any illusion that we were contributing to collective
security would disappear.59
From the above, it appears that Prime Mulroney is seeking to aggressively
continue improvements set in motion by the DSR and to make Canada a more
valuable partner in collective security.
The Conservative government of Prime Minister Mulroney has in fact
pledged to improve Canada's flagging military posture. On 5 June 1987, the
^Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States: Dependence and
Divergence, 230.
57Byers, Adelphi Papers 214, 11.
58Canada, Department of National Defense, Challenge and Commitment, 45.
59Ibid., 45-46.
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government made public the long awaited defense White Paper.60 This paper
on Canada's defense posture was the first in sixteen years. But unlike the
1971 defense policy paper that reflected the optimistic political situation of
the detente era, the 1987 White Paper assessed the threat that the Soviets
pose to the free world and Canada's ever widening commitment-capability
gap in view of this threat.61
In an attempt to narrow this gap, the 1987 White Paper principally called
for enhancing Canada's naval capacity. Specifically, the improvements called
for were: the installation of a seafloor sonar system in the Arctic, the replace-
ment of the 26 year old Sea King helicopters, the construction of six new
frigates, and the development of a mine counter measure (MCM) capability.
But the most controversial improvement called for was the procurement of 10
to 12 nuclear fast attack submarines (SSNs).62
Another major change called for in the White Paper is changing Canada's
wartime commitment of sending a Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST)
brigade group and two rapid reinforcement squadrons to Norway. This deci-
sion was influenced by the fact that Norway does not permit the stationing of
foreign forces on its soil during peacetime. For this reason, Canadian forces
committed to Norway must be held in reserve inside Canada. The Canadian
leadership judges that these assets may not be able to reach Norway during a
time of crisis; or, if they were successful in reaching Norway, they might be
6
"Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence
Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987).
^Thompson, "Canadian Defense Policy," 106.
^Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment, 49-50.
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cut off from further support. Therefore, it was decided to station these forces
in central Europe, where they would be more readily available in the event of
a crisis.63 It is believed that these improvements and changes will provide
Canada with:
A maritime defense policy which will provide for the exercise of sea control
in support of sovereignty in three oceans will indicate to the world that
Canada is serious about the supportand protection of its interests. At last
Canada will be seen as a credible partner in the defence of North America
and in NATO and not just a token member.64
In particular, these improvements are intended to enhance Canada's
ability to accomplish its articulated defense policy of:
• Maintenance of strategic deterrence,
• Credible conventional defence,
• Protection of Canadian sovereignty,
• Peaceful settlement of international disputes, and
• Effective arms control.65
Considering previous defense policies and military expenditures over the
past three decades, these improvements proposed in the 1987 White Paper
marked a radical shift in Canada's political views towards military prepared-
ness. This shift is evident in an examination of the defense objectives set forth
in the 1964 and 1971 White Papers. The foreign policy views of previous
63Ibid., 61-62.
64Andrew C. McMillin, "Three-Ocean Policy would Enhance Credibility," Chronicle-
Herald, Ottawa, June 3, 1987, 1.
65Canada, Department of National Defense, Challenge and Commitment, 49.
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administrations were distinct from those of the current Mulroney
government.
The Canadian government believes that the SSNs called for in the 1987
White Paper will enhance its ability to make an enduring contribution to
collective security. It is believed that this can be achieved through the accom-
plishment of its defense policy objectives. A review of these objectives and
how the proposed SSNs might aid in their accomplishment is offered to gain
some insight into why Canada has chosen to go nuclear. While Arms Control
and Peacekeeping efforts are admirable, because of their diplomatic nature
and the limited scope for SSNs in the accomplishment of these two goals, a
discussion of these objectives is not offered.
A. MAINTENANCE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
The Canadian government acknowledges the importance of strategic
deterrence and recognizes that it can only be achieved through a strategic
balance between the superpowers. Furthermore, it is postulated that strategic
deterrence can only be maintained by the possession of of a diversified
nuclear force. Although the Canadian government recognizes the importance
of a credible nuclear force, it has made it clear that Canada has no intention
to acquire nuclear weapons. The government believes that Canada can best
serve strategic deterrence through means such as NORAD and other
measures that deny the Soviets access to North America, leaving the actual
possession and use of such weapons to their allies. Moreover, the Canadian
government believes that the West can not rely solely upon nuclear weapons
for deterrence. Instead, the alliance must also possess credible conventional
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forces to counter aggression. The obvious benefit of possessing such forces is
that deterrence becomes more credible and the nuclear threshold is raised.
B. CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE
While Canada delegates nuclear deterrence to its allies, it believes that it
can make a credible contribution to deterrence through conventional means.
One of the primary reasons given for the proposed acquisition of 10 to 12
SSNs is to bolster the "collective maritime strength of the Alliance."66 It is
stated that the SSNs can enhance the collective maritime strength ofNATO
by providing for a three ocean (Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic) patrol capability.
Canada's possession of a three ocean patrol capability not only contri-
butes to collective security but also provides for its security and economic
survival during a time of crises. As previously discussed, Canada possesses
the world's longest coastline and borders three major oceans. Currently, in
the Pacific Canada has only eight frigates/destroyers to provide for its secur-
ity and virtually no patrol capabilities for its Arctic coastline.
In addition, during the past twenty years, seaborne trade has become of
paramount importance for Canada's economic survival. Today, Canada's
trading partners include not only the United States and Western Europe but
also countries of the Pacific rim. These exports accounts for 29 percent of
Canada's GNP and 34 percent of these exports are transported by sea.67
Moreover, many vital resources arrive in Canada by sea. With the opening of
66Ibid., 49.
67Bruce Johnston, "Three Ocean Strategy: Right for Canada, Right for NATO," Canadian
Defence Quarterly, 17, February 1988, 33.
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the Arctic for exploration, it can be expected that the sea in the no to distant
future will play an even more vital role.
It is, for example, maintained that "...vital sea lines [must] be maintained
in order to resupply and reinforce Western Europe."68 Clearly, the Canadian
government believes that SSNs will enhance its capability to defend NATO
SLOCs in the Atlantic during a time of conventional war. Increasing NATO's
capability to conduct successful SLOC operations enhances deterrence by
demonstrating to the Soviets that an invasion of Western Europe would be
met by an effective military response.
Similarly, the Canadian government judges that SSNs in the Pacific
could help to keep open vital sea lines between North America and countries
of the Western Pacific as well as between Alaska and the West coast of the
United States. Increasing Soviet operations in the Northeast Pacific region
demonstrate the necessity for Canada to possess the capability to keep these
sea lanes open.
Finally, the deep channels of the Canadian Arctic could provide a
sequestered sanctuary for Soviet submarines to launch cruise or ballistic
missiles or to intercept Western submarines entering the region. Again,
Canadian SSNs may be useful to help to deter the Soviets from pursuing this
strategy.69
The above considerations lend some merit to the arguments for Canada
acquiring SSNs. However, as pointed out below, one of the primary argu-
ments for Canada acquiring SSNs has not centered on enhancing NATO's
68Canada, Department of National Defense, Challenge and Commitment, 50.
69 Ibid.
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defensive capabilities, but instead has centered on Canada asserting its
sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago vis-d-vis the United States.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF CANADA'S SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS
While it is obvious that asserting Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic
archipelago is not the only reason for the proposed acquisition of the 10 to 12
SSNs, it is certainly an issue that has received a great deal of publicity in the
debate over Canada's new defense policy.
The White Paper states that "...after the defense of the country itself,
there is no issue more important to any nation than the protection of its
sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is the very
essence of nationhood."70 It is further stated that the government will not
permit "...Canadian sovereignty to be diminished in any way."71 These
statements appear to be primarily directed toward the United States, which
has not recognized the Northwest Passage (Figure 3.1) as falling within
Canada's internal waters. Joe Clark, the Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs, has gone on record as saying, "...the greatest threat to
sovereignty in the Arctic is the U.S."72
It is proposed that these submarines, "independently or in cooperation
with other [allied] maritime forces, would be responsible for deterring or
countering challenges to territorial sovereignty."73 Canada does not plan to
™lbid., 23.
71 Ibid., 24.






Figure 3.1. Northwest Passage: Routes through Canadian Waters.74
attack a foreign submarine during peace time, but if a foreign submarine is
encountered, it will be identified by photographs or technical signatures and a
formal complaint will be filed through diplomatic channels. 75
The issue of sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago was first raised in
1876, when an American named William Mintzer sent ships and men to
Cumberland Sound to mine and load mica without proper permission.
Although he had requested prior permission two years earlier from the
British government without any response, Canadians were outraged at
73Ibid.
74Ibid., 68.
75Francis, "Canada to Join World's Exclusive Nuclear-Sub Club," 10.
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Mintzer's actions. This incident marked the beginning of the dispute over
Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago.76
Not wanting to be party to any territorial entanglements between the
United States and Canada, the British government in 1880 relinquished title
to Canada of some 380,000 square miles of islands between Canada and
Greenland. The transferred area included both the Northern waters and the
continental shelves.77 The ceded region supposedly gave Canada exclusive
control over the entire Arctic archipelago region.
After the Mintzer incident and the transfer of the Arctic archipelago, no
other complaints about sovereignty encroachment surfaced for the next
ninety years. In fact, the United States and Canada cooperated in numerous
joint ventures within the region without any accusations of U.S. encroach-
ment. The sovereignty issue was not rekindled until 1969, when the ice-
breaker Manhattan transited one of the routes through the Northwest
Passage.78 In this incident, the U.S. informed Canadian officials of the
Manhattan's impending passage and Canada even sent along observers to
participate; still, outcries of sovereignty encroachment surfaced throughout
Canada. The Manhattan's transit marked a new era in the sovereignty debate
over the Arctic archipelago, one that would not soon be forgotten.
The incident that has brought the sovereignty dispute to its current
intensity was the 1985 transit of the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaker Polar Sea
(WAGB-11) from Thule, Greenland, to the Chukchi Sea (See Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2. Canada's Arctic Waters.79
Again, the U.S. government informed Canada of the Polar Sea's planned pas-
sage; however, in response, "Canada informed the U.S. that it considered all
waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago as historic internal waters and
that a request for authorization to transit the Northwest Passage would be
necessary."80 Obviously, the U.S. placed little credence in Canada's claim
because the Polar Sea proceeded to transit the Northwest Passage to its ulti-
mate destination without requesting the permission of the Canadian
79Pharand, "Arctic Sovereignty: Does Canada own the Northwest Passage?," Proceedings,
July 1988, 98.
°°Donat Pharand, "Arctic Sovereignty: Does Canada own the Northwest Passage?,"
Proceedings, July 1988, 98.
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government. Other complaints of sovereignty encroachment have been
spurred by U.S. SSNs transiting from the Atlantic Ocean between Canada
and Greenland through the archipelago into the Arctic. (See Table 3.1) In
1986, the Pentagon released photographs of three U.S. SSNs surfaced at the
North Pole.81 Canadians know that the U.S. uses the route between Canada
and Greenland instead of the route between Greenland and Norway to reach
the Arctic because it is less likely that U.S. submarines will be detected by the
Soviets; nevertheless, this fact has had little effect upon quieting the en-
croachment complaints.82 As might be expected, Canadians have been
Canadians have been outraged by the U.S. actions and the sovereignty issue
has reached a new level of intensity.
The U.S. has maintained that the Northwest Passage is an international
strait and therefore falls into the same basic category as the high seas. As
delineated in the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in
1958, "a coastal state could not suspend innocent passage in straits used for
international navigation. Moreover, the 1982 convention establishes a more
liberal right of 'transit passage' for aircraft and submerged submarines as
well as surface ships..
."83 Therefore, if the Northwest Passage is believed to
be an international strait under international law, Canada loses all rights to
its claim of sovereignty over the region's international waters.
81Herbert Denton, "Canada Plans a Military Buildup in the Arctic Sensing a U.S. Threat
to its Sovereignty," Washington Post, 14 May 1987, 35.
82
"Canada's Plan for Nuclear Submarines Raises U.S. Suspicion," New York Times, 4
May 1987, 14.
83Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron, Charles L. 0. Buderi., Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy
Dilemma, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1983),151.
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S^Norman Polmar, "Sailing Under the Ice," Proceedings, June 1984, 122.
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However, Canada does not agree with the U.S. declaration; and as a
result, Joe Clark announced that Canada was invoking the "straight baseline"
provision of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention.85 In essence, the straight baseline is a means of defining the area
in which Canada claims exclusive sovereignty. According to Clark, the
baselines will "...define the outer limits of Canada's historic inland waters."86
Although Mr. Clark is quite adamant about Canada's rights to sover-
eignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, a closer examination of two
legal determinants of sovereignty reveals that Canada's claim to the entire
region is somewhat questionable.
Donat Pharand has examined some of the more prominent arguments
offered in support of Canada's right to sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago.
Professor Pharand considers two legal determinants of sovereignty: historic
title and baselines.81
In the case of historic title, some may wrongly assume that the British
transfer of this region to Canada in 1880 constituted Canada's ownership or
historic title to this region. However, as Professor Pharand points out, for
historic title to be surmised applicable to the waters surrounding the Arctic
archipelago, "Canada would have to establish that over the years it has
exercised the same kind of exclusive control that is required to acquire
85Pharand, "Arctic Sovereignty: Does Canada Own the Northwest Passage'




sovereignty over land areas."88 In addition, "Canada would have to show that
its claim has been met by the acquiescence of foreign states, particularly
those directly affected."89 As previously discussed, Canada was without a
naval capability until the early twentieth century and even after the Navy's
establishment it was incapable of providing for the control of the waters in
the Arctic archi-pelago region. Moreover, none of the countries within the
Arctic region have conceded sovereignty over these sea areas to Canada.
Thus, Canada's claim of sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago
does not meet the historic title test of exclusive control test; and Canada
therefore can not claim ownership under these auspices.
On the other hand, Professor Pharand argues that Canada is justified in
applying baselines (Figure 3.2) around the islands of the Arctic archipelago in
establishing the perimeter of its sovereign waters. This contention is based on
the fact that the archipelago contains numerous scattered islands and it is
virtually impossible to determine territorial waters in the prevailing condi-
tions. Therefore, the placement of baselines around the outermost perimeter
of the islands compensates for the irregularities of the islands' coastlines and
encapsulates the region in which Canada assumes sovereignty.90
As previously mentioned, the baseline provision is covered by both the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1958 Convention; however, the






have suggested. While the 1958 convention and the 1982 convention do pro-
vide for the establishment of baselines in some situations, they do not provide
for the encapsulation of an international strait into a country's territorial
domain. Ambassador James Malone, who was the Special Representative of
the President for the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, pointed out that
the baseline provision cannot be applied around an archipelago in conjunction
with a continental land mass.91 Moreover, one cannot claim sovereignty over
an international strait.
Professor Pharand argues that the Northwest Passage is not an inter-
national strait. In supporting this argument, he used evidence provided by
the Corfu Channel Case of 1949. In this case, the tests that were used in the
determination of an international waterway -were geography and function.
The geographical test is satisfied whenever "the territorial waters in the
natural passage between adjacent landmasses overlap, joining two parts of
the high seas...or a part of the high seas with the territorial sea of a foreign
state."92 The Northwest Passage meets the geographic criteria for an inter-
national strait established in the Corfu Channel Case.
However, in the case of function, Professor Pharand states that the
Northwest Passage fails to meet this criterion. The functional criterion is
principally based upon the number of ships that transit a strait. During the
past 80 years, there have been only 45 complete transits as opposed to thou-
sands of ships that have transited the Corfu Channel; therefore, the professor
91Discussion with Ambassador Malone at the Naval Postgraduate School, 13 July 1988.
92 Donat Pharand, "Arctic Sovereignty: Does Canada own the Northwest Passage?,"
Proceedings, July 1988, 99.
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judges that the limited use of the Northwest Passage serves as a means of
disqualifying it from falling into the category of an international strait. In his
view, the Northwest Passage should be deemed territorial waters under
Canadian sovereignty.93
Pharand's conclusion, if accepted, would serve to strengthen Canada's
position. Given the arduous nature of penetrating this region, however, the 45
transits may satisfy the function criterion. In other words the Corfu Channel





Even before the White Paper announced plans to procure 10 to 12 nuclear
fast attack submarines, plans were underway to procure conventional
replacements for the three Oberon submarines. A Project Management Office
(PMO) had been established and negotiations were underway with possible
source contractors. However, after it was announced that nuclear-powered
submarines were favored as replacements, the PMO was terminated and a
new Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project (CASAP) was established.94
CASAP is responsible for the planning and procurement of Canada's first
nuclear submarine force. Figure 4.1 lists the events and milestones that
CASAP plans to accomplish in the acquisition of the SSNs.
A. SOURCE
Although Canadians have been building nuclear power plants to generate
electricity since the 1950s, they do not possess the technical expertise to build
nuclear submarines. Therefore, first on the agenda for CASAP is the selection
of a prime contractor that will build the submarines. To aid CASAP in the
selection process, a memoranda of understanding (MOU) have been signed
with Great Britain and France, the two possible source contractors. These
memoranda of understanding (MOU) have been signed with Great Britain
and France, the two possible source contractors. These memoranda have
^Canada, Department of National Defence, Backgrounder Documentation: Canadian
Submarine Acquisition Project, (Ottawa: 1987) 1.
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enabled CASAP to obtain both cost and technical information that will aid in
its decision as to which submarine to recommend to the government.
r Selection of Country



























Figure 4.1. Events and Milestones for CASAP.95
95Ibid.,6.
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It might be speculated that no U.S. contractors were considered as a
possible source contractor because of the potential political friction between
the two governments over the proposed use of the submarines. It has been
reported that when Canada first announced plans to procure nuclear sub-
marines, no U.S. defense contractor took the notion seriously.96 The
Canadian government has stated that the reason for excluding U.S. contrac-
tors from the bidding process was not politically inspired, but rather the
result of cost considerations. As a matter of fact, the United States is cur-
rently building only the 688 Los Angeles class SSN at a cost of approximately
$750 million per copy.97
Considering Canada's historic austerity in defense spending, cost may
well have been a major contributing factor in excluding U.S. contractors.
Nevertheless, because of technology transfer agreements, the U.S. will ulti-
mately play a major role in CASAP no matter who Canada chooses to build its
submarines.
The two submarines being considered by the Canadian government are
the British-built Trafalgar Class and the French-built Rubis Class. Table 4.1,
compares some of the technical characteristics of these two competitors.
As shown, the Trafalgar is the larger and faster of the two boats. Moreover,
the British claim that the Trafalgar possesses operational superiority over
the Rubis in that it is quieter and capable of traveling under and breaking
96David Silverberg, "U.S. Navy May Snag Canadian Nuclear Sub Buy," Defense News, 23
November 1987, 1.
97Francis, "Canada to Join World's exclusive Nuclear Sub Club," 10.
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TABLE 4.1. COMPARISON OF RUBIS AND TRAFALGAR CLASS
SUBMARINES98














Machinery: 2 Turbo Alternators:
1 Electric Main Motor
2 geared
Steam turbines




Speed: 25 Knots 32 knots
Armament: 4X21in(533mm)
tubes
5 X 21 in (533 mm)
tubes





^"Canada's Fact Sheet (Pamphlet) Department of National Defence, NP.
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through ice of more than one meter." Given that one of the expressed pur-
poses of Canada's SSN program is to maintain a patrol under the Arctic ice,
these capabilities are critical and probably give the Trafalgar a slight edge in
the competition.
Meanwhile, the French have indirectly acknowledged the limitations of
the Rubis by promising to reinforce its conning tower, giving it the capability
of surfacing through the Arctic ice. 100 Additionally, the French recently
launched an enhanced version of the Rubis, with improved detection and
weapons capabilities. The improvements include more sensitive listening
devices, a very low-frequency towed array, new tactical data processing
systems, and the capability of launching simultaneously the SM-39, the
submarine-launched Exocet, and multi-purpose wire-guided torpedoes. 101
While the Canadians appear to favor the British as a supplier, the choice
is complicated because of a 1958 agreement between the United States and
Great Britain barring the transfer of nuclear technology to a third country. 102
In addition, Canada and the United States signed an agreement, in 1959,
that bars Canada from receiving nuclear technology from a third nation. 103
Although in October 1987 the U.S. gave Britain preliminary approval to
"David R. Francis, "Canada Takes Nuclear-Sub Plunge," The Christian Science Monitor,




"France Launches SSN," Jane's Defense Weekly, "France Launches SSN," 14 May
1988, 920.
102
"Canada Sees Nuclear Subs As Key to Arctic Defenses," Aviation Week, 21 Septem-
ber, 1987, 88.
103
"SSN for Canada: Path Cleared," Jane's Defense Weekly, 7 May 1988, 871.
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provide Canada with data on the Trafalgar propulsion plant and President
Reagan reaffirmed this decision in his meeting with Canadian Prime Minister
Mulroney in May 1988, the Canadian government is cautiously awaiting the
final approval of the U.S. Congress before announcing its decision as to which
submarine it will purchase. 104 In an article for the Toronto Globe and Mail,
U.S. Congressman Charles E. Bennett, Chairman of the Seapower
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, voiced his concerns
with the transfer of nuclear technology to Canada. He stated that:
...Congress should bear in mind [when considering this issue]...that buying
anything but the best submarines would likely not make much of a differ-
ence in combating Soviet submarines....Canada does not appear ready to
spend enough money to buy such a capability. Unless Canadians are willing
to pay the costs of developing a truly independent nuclear-propulsion pro-
gram....U.S. assistance at the outset could lead to U.S. involvement forever.
The United States would be put in the position of accepting considerable
responsibility for a long-term program over which it would not exercise
adequate control. 105
Should the Canadians choose the smaller French Rubis class submarine,
nuclear technology could be transferred without U.S. consent; but the French
submarine is not compatible with the superior U.S.-built MK 48 torpedo, the
standard torpedo of NATO. 106
The two fundamental differences between the French-built L5 and the
MK 48 are the homing modes and speeds at which the torpedo travels. The L5
has only a passive/active homing mode with a maximum speed of 35 knots.
10
*Ibid.
105Toronto Globe and Mail, 29 October 87, A7, cited in The Centre For Foreign Policy
Studies Defence Newsletter, 6, October 1987, 10-11.
106
"Canada Sees Nuclear Subs as Key," 85.
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On the other hand, the MK 48 is wire-guided, its guidance can be controlled
by a member of a submarine crew, and as a backup it also is equipped with a
passive/active homing modes. It is reported that the MK 48 can achieve
speeds of 55 knots. 107 To make the Rubis compatible with the MK 48, U.S.
permission would be required.
Providing that all of the technology transfer problems are resolved, the
first contracts for the new submarines are scheduled for release in 1990, with
the first submarine to be ready to join MARCOM by late 1996. 108
B. COST
The Canadian government has estimated that the submarine program
will cost a total of 8 billion dollars (Canadian) over a period of 15 years. Of
this total amount, it is forecast that 5 billion will be spent for the proposed
SSNs and 3 billion will be spent for training, infrastructure, and weapons. 109
When one considers that Canada currently spends a total of only $10.34
billion(Canadian) per year on its combined armed forces, the SSN acquisition
is indeed an ambitious undertaking by the Canadian Government.
To make this total expenditure more palatable to the Canadian citizenry,
the government has committed itself to an annual "real growth in the defense
budget of two percent per year after inflation, for the fifteen-year planning
10
'J.R. Hill, Admiral RN (Ret), Anti-Submarine Warfare, (Annapolis: Naval Instituted
Press 1985), 91.
W°Facts About Canada's Nuclear-Propelled Submarines, (Pamphlet), Department of
National Defence 4.
109R.E. Stansfield, "Canadian Navy Steers New Course," The Submarine Review,
January 1988, 32.
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period." 110 Within this 15 year planning period, the government will intro-
duce a "rolling five-year" plan that will be reviewed each year to "establish
budgets for the following five-year period, and planning guidance for the
remaining ten-years." 111
C. CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED SUBMARINE PLAN
As one might expect, the announcement of the decision to purchase
nuclear submarines drew immediate criticism from both within and outside
Canada. An opinion poll recently conducted by the Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament determined that 59 percent of those responding
disapproved of the proposed submarine plan. 112 The two underlying reasons
for the disapproval of the submarine program appear to be cost and the
possible employment of the submarine force. This is not surprising when one
considers Canada's historic ambivalence toward the military.
As previously stated, the Canadian government has estimated that the
proposed submarine plan will cost 8 billion dollars (Canadian) over a period of
15 years. Critics believe that this is a very conservative estimate. 113 Defense
planners, both within and outside Canada, have estimated that the cost of the
associated infrastructure could easily raise the cost of the submarine plan to
110Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment, 67.
Ullbid.
112Ottawa Citizen, 26 May 1988. D19. Cited in the Contre for Foreign Policy Students,
Department of Political Sciences, Dalhousie University, Defense Newsletter 7, May 1988, 19.
^^Canadian Nuclear Submarine Fact Sheet, Department of National Defence. 2.
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10 billion dollars. 114 In view of the price tag, many Canadians believe that
the SSN plan is simply too expensive for Canada. Additionally, critics within
the government fear that the expense of the submarine plan will cripple other
defense programs. Brig-Gen. Terry Liston, Chief of Operational and Force
Development, said, "...the navy would almost certainly have to cancel the last
6 of 18 new patrol frigates now planned."115 Aside from cost considerations,
critics fear that the nuclear submarines will lead to Canada's involvement in
"the tense undersea maneuvering between the United States and Soviet
nuclear fleets."116
It is assumed that there has been no public British government criticism
of Canada's submarine procurement plan because of the possibility of Great
Britain becoming a source supplier. However, in an editorial in the British
Economist magazine it was stated that the purchase of the submarines:
...appeals to the anti-American plasma that flows through many Canadian
veins but it can do neither them nor the alliance any good to spend so much
money feeding their resentments. Canadian officials admit that they drew
up the plan for 10-12 submarines without much idea of the total cost. They
were taken aback when British mathematicians totted up the probable all-
in figure. [The magazine says there are better uses for the money]...such as
putting an armoured division or two into West Germany, instead of the
lonely little brigade it has there now. 117




"Canada May Lose Nuclear Sub Plan," New York Times, 27 November 1987, 13.
117Halifax Daily News, May 12, 1988, 1. Cited in the Contre for Foreign Policy Students,
Department of Political Sciences, Dalhousie University, Defense Newsletter 7, May 1988, 17.
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The United States' principal concern with Canada's proposed submarine
plan is that one of the apparent purposes might be to deny U.S. fast attack
submarines access to the Arctic. In the U.S. view, the very essence of North
America's security is dependent upon U.S. submarine operations in the
Arctic, and U.S. access to the Arctic must not be abridged. Another U.S.
criticism is that the cost of the submarines could have a detrimental impact
upon Canada's future conventional force posture. Moreover, Americans argue,
the resources allocated for the submarine program could have a more positive
impact upon deterrence and defensive capabilities if they were applied toward
rebuilding Canada's deteriorated conventional forces in both NORAD and
NATO. 118 In view of Canada's historically low military expenditures, the U.S.
shares the concern that the financial commitment to the submarine program
could, in effect, doom other Canadian forces to mediocrity. Furthermore, a
future consequence of the program might be that "other Canadian govern-
ments perhaps less committed to defense than the Mulroney government will
use the high cost of 'sovereignty protection' as an excuse for hollowing out the
Canadian contribution to Europe."119
The bottom line of U.S. concerns about the Canadian submarine program
has probably been best summed up by Charles Doran as follows:
The United States, Japan and Canada's European allies fear that Canada
is confusing sovereignty with security. Security for North America they
believe, begins on the Elbe, not on the St. Lawrence. Moreover, the 'oppor-
tunity costs' for this type of expenditure are very high. Real security,
11°"Canada Plans A Military Buildup in Arctic; Sensing A U.S. Threat to its Sovereignty,
Ottawa May Buy Nuclear Submarines," Washington Post, 14 May 1987, sec. A, 35
119Charles F. Doran "Canadian Relations With the United States," Current History, 527
(March 1988): 100.
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security of the type that will strengthen the conventional deterrent in
Europe through an enlarged Canadian presence, or security that in some
way will help enhance the capacity to extend deterrence to Europe, would
require a quite different commitment. 120
A final reported concern of the U.S. is the prospect of Canada having a
nuclear accident that could have a detrimental impact upon the nuclear
power programs of the United States. It is reportedly feared that an accident
in Canada could strengthen anti-nuclear sentiments in the U.S and under-
mine support for the U.S. nuclear submarine program. Captain Robert
Hofford, Naval Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, stated in Ottawa at a
conference on the Canadian defense industry that, if an accident should
happen, "we can't wipe our hands of the Canadian program."121
The Soviets have expressed a more cautious reaction to the announced
nuclear submarine plan. In an October 1987 speech at Murmansk, Soviet
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled his proposal for developing
what he called an "Arctic Zone of Peace." Specifically, he called upon both
Arctic and Nordic countries to join with the Soviet Union in making the
region a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
and a region for scientific, environmental and developmental research co-
operation. 122 Since 1958, the Soviets have continued to demonstrate an
interest in Nordic arms control measures; but the geographic scope of this
interest had remained centered upon the Northern European countries, with-
out including a significant portion of the Circumpolar region. While arms
120lbid.
121Hofford cited in Silverberg, 35.
122Cleve Archer, "Russia's Arctic Dimension," World Today 44, March 1988, 47.
54
control proposals for the latter region have been common since 1964, they
have been left under the auspices of the various countries within the region
and the Soviets have shown very little interest. 123
Although Gorbachev's proposals did not address security issues in the
Circumpolar Region per se, they did set the stage for proposals in this region
that would shortly follow. In talks in Oslo and Stockholm, Soviet Premier
Nikolai Ryzhkov called for reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises in the
Arctic to once every two years and a limitation on Soviet and U.S. submarine
activity in the Arctic. Alexei Makarov, first counselor at the Soviet Embassy
in Ottawa, said in a press conference, that:
...[Ryzhkov's] plan would enable Canada to scale down its own militariza-
tion of the north, including ending approval of U.S. cruise missile testing
over the Northwest Territories as well as cancelling the purchase of the
submarine fleet. 124
It is obvious from the timing of the Soviet proposal that Canada's pro-
posed submarine plan has gained the interest of the Soviets. Canada's
Defence Minister Perrin Beaty, cognizant of prior Soviet unwillingness to
include the Kola Peninsula (discussed in the next chapter) in any negoti-
ations, stated that "the Soviet proposal is unacceptable if it does not
specifically include the huge Soviet military installation on the Kola
Peninsula." 125
123Ronald G. Purver, "Arctic Arms Control: Constrains and Opportunities," Canadian
Institute For International Peace 3, February 1988. 37-38.
124Makarov cited in David R. Francis, "Canada Gives Cautious Reception to Soviet Arctic
Proposals," The Christian Science Monitor, 19 February 1987, 9.
125Beaty cited in Francis, "Canada gives cautious reception to Soviet Arctic proposals," 9.
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V. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARCTIC
During the past 30 years, the Arctic region has taken on new strategic
significance. Jan Breemer's description of this region gives one an appreci-
ation for the environmental complexities that the Arctic presents to the
NATO allies in countering the ever increasing threat posed by Soviet
submarines.
The Arctic Ocean is the world's fourth largest ocean. With a total area of
more than 14 million square kilometers, it is nearly six times as large as the
Mediterranean Sea and more than seven times the size of the Caribbean
Sea. About 40 percent of the Arctic is permanently covered with a multi-
year ice pack; its thickness varies, on the average, from eight to 16 feet at
the end of winter, to five to 10 feet at the close of summer, In some places,
thickness measures nearly 200 feet, but in others it can be only a few
inches. 126
Clearly, the Arctic poses a formidable challenge to mariners. From this
vast, inhospitable ice-laden region, Soviet submarines can hide and strike
targets anywhere within the North American continent. While it is obvious
that current U.S. interests in the Arctic include being able to respond to this
threat, a look back at the United States' activities within this region will
illustrate how U.S. interests have evolved.
A. U.S. INTEREST
The United States' interest in the Arctic region prior to the late 1950s
was principally inspired by American adventurism and scientific exploration.
l26Jan Breemer, "Ice Wars: Battle Beneath the North Pole-Tomorrow's Cold War,
International Combat Arms, July 1988, 78.
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The first American expedition into the Arctic region came in 1850 with the
failed attempt of U.S. Navy Lieutenant Edwin Jesse De Havin to locate the
lost British expedition commander Sir John Franklin. 127 As a result of the
publicity Lieutenant De Haven's expedition received and, most probably,
because the frontiers of the U.S. were running out, adventurers came to view
the Arctic region as the new frontier. Between of 1850 and 1909, when Com-
modore Perry discovered the North Pole, dozens of Americans led expeditions
that explored the vast Arctic region. 128
By the 1930s, most of the surface of this vast region had been explored by
some combination of air or surface exploration. Nevertheless, one frontier in
the Arctic still remained: that of the subsurface. The rapid advances in sub-
marine technology had now made this venture possible. The first attempt at
conquering the Arctic subsurface was made by Sir Hubert Wilkins, an
Australian, aboard the former U.S. Navy submarine Nautilus. Although this
attempt failed as a result of equipment malfunction, it nevertheless sowed the
seeds for a new era of Arctic exploration.
Success in conquering the Arctic subsurface was not finally achieved
until 1958, when the USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the first U.S. nuclear powered
submarine, circumnavigated the Arctic Ocean. "This cruise demonstrated
the feasibility of a new submerged sea route that reduced the distance from
127Dean C. Allard, "To the North Pole," Proceedings, September 1987, 56.
128Ibid., 60-63.
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London to Tokyo by 4,700 miles."129 Moreover, the Nautilus' accomplish-
ments would give the Arctic region new strategic importance with the advent
of the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
U.S. scientific efforts in the Arctic have primarily focused on the study of
weather and other environmental factors. These studies have provided a
wealth of information that has served both commercial and naval interests.
Commercially, the Alaskan fishing and oil industries have reaped huge
benefits from this ongoing research. From a naval prospective, naval opera-
tions in the Arctic would be severely handicapped if it were not for research
into ice movement, ice thickness, and the characteristics of the Arctic waters
for ASW purposes. 130
While U.S. interests in the Arctic began with humanitarian and scientific
efforts, today it is of paramount importance that the U.S. maintain a credible
presence in the Arctic region. U.S. nuclear-powered submarines have become
the mainstay of U.S. military and scientific activity in the Arctic region. 131
For security reasons, the U.S. cannot and, it may be hoped, will not let its
access to this region be constrained in a way that would damage Western
security interests.
B. CANADIAN INTEREST
While a large portion of the open discussion in Canada has focused upon
the sovereignty issue in the Arctic archipelago, some Canadians look beyond
129ibid., 65.
130Breemer, 77.
131Norman Polmar, "Sailing Under the Ice," Proceedings, June 1984, 121.
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this issue and view the real threat to Canada as coming from the Soviet
presence in the circumpolar region. U.S. and Canadian interests converge on
this very important issue. For unknown reasons, some Canadians have
chosen to publicly play down the actual threat posed by the Soviets in the
Canadian domestic debates pertaining to the proposed acquisition of the
SSNs. As an example, in the 1987 White Paper, an 87 page report, less than
three pages of text were devoted to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
However, whether it is an oversight or a deliberate attempt not to cause
alarm, Canada's geopolitical position makes Canada prominent within Soviet
military strategy.
Canada's involvement in collective security, its geographic location, and
its economic ties with the United States and other allies make its involvement
unavoidable in a confrontation between East and West. While the Canadian
forces in Europe are small, the country's economic infrastructure poses a
threat to the Soviet Union. Because of the potential of Canada mobilizing its
economy to support the West in a conflict, Canada is vulnerable to Soviet
attack in a protracted war. Therefore, it could make sense, in a conventional
war, for the Soviets to launch attacks against Canada's war making potential.
Soviet attacks against Canada would probably include ALCMs and
SLCMs. While there is some margin of defense against bomber-delivered
ALCMs with the DEW and NWS warning systems, currently Canada
possesses no defense against SLCMs launched from points not covered by
these warning systems. As Commander Haydon points out, Canada and some
parts of the United States could be targeted with Soviet SS-X-21 and possibly
SS-NX-24 SLCMs. These missiles are believed to have ranges of 3,000 km and
59
1,600 km respectively. 132 These may in fact be conservative estimates of
SLCM ranges when one considers the rapid advances in Soviet weapon
technology.
Using these ranges Commander Peter Haydon has theorized possible
launch positions for these missiles and the targets that would be acquired.
The assumption made in this analysis is that the Soviets could launch their
missiles in water that is less than 50 percent covered by ice. 133 Table 5.1
summarizes these possible launch positions and their possible targets. These
launch positions in the Arctic archipelago provide the Soviets with deep water
close to North America. This obviously complicates allied ASW problems.
As pointed out by John Honderich, another potential threat to Canada
posed by the Soviets in a protracted nuclear war resided in the possibility
that:
. . .the Soviets might well dispatch commando-type units to land in the
Arctic. Their purpose would be to sabotage pipelines or act as a diversion to
keep some Canadian and U.S. resources focused on the North, instead of
elsewhere. 134
Because more than 70 percent of the Canadian population lives along the
border with the United States, Soviet nuclear attacks could threaten
Canada's population both directly and indirectly. Therefore, Canadian
defense planners share many of the same concerns as the United States about
132Peter T. Haydon, "The Strategic Importance of the Arctic: Understanding the Military
Issues," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring 1988, 29.
133Ibid., 29.
134John Honderich, Arctic Imperative: Is Canada Losing the North? (Toronto: University
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the Soviet threat from the circumpolar region. Despite the rhetoric about
sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago, Soviet attacks on either Canada or the
U.S. would most assuredly have an adverse effect upon the other.
Because of these concerns and those pointed out below, informed Cana-
dians share the same concerns about the Arctic as does the United States.
Therefore, the principal threat to Canada's sovereignty and security lies with
the Soviets and not with the United States.
C. SOVIET INTEREST
Russia's interest in the Arctic came as a result of its proximity to the
region. Recorded Russian history shows that explorers first reached the Kola
Peninsula in the ninth century. During the following two centuries, Russian
fur traders made inroads into the regions adjoining the Barents and White
Seas. Although the Arctic possessed great economic potential, the harsh
weather conditions precluded militarization of the region until well into the
20th century, when technology had advanced to the point that the inhos-
pitable climate conditions could serve as a Soviet advantage. 136 The nuclear
submarine, the submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the intercontinental
bomber are three of the key advances that have given the Soviets a war-fight-
ing capability in the Arctic region.
Today, the Arctic is believed to be one of four Soviet maritime Theaters of
Military Operations (TVD). This TVD not only encompasses the Arctic Basin
but also includes the Norwegian Sea, Greenland Sea, Baffin Bay, and the
136Charles C. Petersen, Soviet Military Objectives in the Arctic Theater and How They
Might be Attained. (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986.) DTIC, AD-A175359. 1.
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Hudson Bay. 137 The fleet responsible for military action in this TVD is the
Northern Fleet. In addition to its surface and subsurface assets, the Northern
Fleet "has its own naval aviation, naval infantry, coastal defense, and special
warfare (spetsnaz) components." 138
Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has called the Kola Penin-
sula, where the greater part of this fleet is based, "...the most valuable piece
of real estate on earth." 139 The Soviet naval complex on the Kola Peninsula is
one of the largest installations of its kind in the world. 140 Norman Polmar
describes the Northern Fleet's assets as follows:
Today the Northern Fleet has almost 50 percent of the Soviet Navy's sub-
marines, some 26 percent of the surface warships (frigates and larger units),
about 27 percent of the naval aircraft, and 26 percent of naval personnel
...The Northern and Pacific fleets share all of the navy's nuclear submarines
and ballistic missile submarines (except for the six Golf-class SSBs assigned
to the Baltic Fleet and the GolfV missile trials submarine in the Black Sea
Fleet). 141
The Northern Fleet is the largest of the three European fleets—Northern,
Baltic, and Black Sea—and assumes several other important roles besides
naval operations in the Arctic region. Because it has a more direct access to
137Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute
Press, 1986), 17.
138lbid.
139Lehman cited in Leonard A LeSchack, "ComNavForArctic," Proceedings, September
1987, 74.
140Simon Ollivant, Conflict Studies 172: Arctic Challenge to NATO (London: The
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984), p. 3.
141Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 19.
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the Atlantic Ocean than the two other European fleets, the Northern Fleet is
charged with the responsibility of providing for naval operations in the
Atlantic. Moreover, as a result of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which
restricted submarine transits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
the Northern fleet provides submarines for operations in the
Mediterranean. 142
It is reported that the Soviets believe that in order to gain control of the
seas in a particular area, control must first be obtained of the surrounding air
and land. From this line of reasoning, it follows that the Soviets believe that
events occurring ashore will have a great impact upon the events at sea. 143 If
the Soviets do in fact believe this, the possible implications are that during a
time of hostilities, the amphibious components of the Northern Fleet will
probably take immediate actions against Norway, Iceland and the North Sea
approaches to the Danish Straits in paving the way for their projected victory
at sea. 144
While there is general agreement among Western naval analysts about
the likelihood of the Soviet Union taking action against the above land
masses in securing its flanks, analysts disagree as to how the Soviets might
employ the Northern Fleet's SSNs and SSBNs. As a result, two divergent
hypotheses have evolved. It is now widely accepted throughout the U.S. Navy
that, if hostilities were to break out, the Soviets would keep the bulk of these
142lbid.
143Petersen, 4.
l44Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 19.
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assets in "bastions" near the Soviet Union. From within these bastions, the
Soviets could provide defense in depth for their SSBNs and at the same time
provide for the protection of the homeland against seaborne attack. 145 The
U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy states that roles such as interdiction of
NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and supporting the army will be
a secondary priority for the Soviet navy. 146
Conversely, there are naval analysts who find the bastion theory overly
optimistic, partly because of the opportunities it might offer to allied ASW
forces. Jan Breemer asserts that:
First of all, it [a bastion deployment] would tie up a very large percent-
age of Soviet fleet assets perhaps needed elsewhere. Second, the biggest
problem in ASW is finding the opponent's submarines. Although the bastion
seas encompass large bodies of water, with plenty of room to hide, they offer
a very distinct "carrot" for Western ASW forces, especially nuclear attack
submarines. 147
Professor Breemer believes that these considerations have had a major
impact upon the Soviet decision to send their SSBNs to hide underneath the
Arctic ice for protection. 148 According to Commander J. J. Tritten:
If bastion defense were the sole mission for Soviet general purpose forces,
there would not need to be the current surplus of submarines that exceed
any logical possible defense requirement....Bastion defense baits the West
to fight on Soviet turf and terms. 149






In support of the Northern Fleet conducting a SLOCs campaign, Com-
mander Tritten states that "there is no question from the manifest and
extremely strong latent evidence that the SLOCs mission exists no matter the
conditions of war (nuclear or conventional)."150 While Admiral Studeman
supports the bastion theory, he also adds further credibility to a Soviet SLOC
campaign:
SLOCs outside the sea denial perimeter will initially be threatened by
relatively few forces, so long as higher priority CVBGs and other nuclear
capable units constitute a threat or until resupply SLOCs become of
strategic importance to the outcome of the conflict. It the Soviets calculated
that their strategic mission could be fulfilled with fewer submarine and air
assets, or if NATO's reinforcement/resupply effort during pre-hostilities
warrants an intensified anti-SLOC campaign at the outset of war, the
Soviets could assign more assets to SLOC interdiction from the outset of
hostilities...
" 151
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to ascertain which course of
action the Soviets might be more likely to pursue in the event of war, it is
clear that if "such predictions should include considerations of hardware,
deployments, and exercises,"152 the Soviets have hedged against anyone pre-
dicting their precise intentions. Not only do Soviet submarines operate in the
most Northern fringes of the Arctic; but they also have operated off the coast
of the United States and Canada and the approaches to and within the Medi-
terranean. As Table 5.1 depicts, missiles carried aboard Soviet SSNs and
SSBNs pose a formidable threat to all NATO countries.
150Ibid.,210.
151Admiral William 0. Studeman, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Issues,
1 March 1988, 12.
152Tritten, 41-65.
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It is believed that 22 Delta Class and four Typhoon Class SSBNs are
assigned to the Northern Fleet. 153 From concealed hiding places under the
Arctic ice, these SSBNs can strike any target within North America, or for
that matter NATO, with a high probability of not being detected. (See Table
5.2, for ranges.) Once Soviet SSBNs enter the Arctic, they are no longer
exposed to the threat of U.S. air or surface ASW. Not only are allied ASW
efforts complicated, but it is unlikely that the Soviets would send these valu-
able assets underneath the ice without the protection of some SSNs. More-
over, the ability of the Western allies to detect Soviet submarines may be
greatly reduced because of the Arctic temperatures. Sound is the principal
sensor medium of a submerged submarine and the temperature, as well as
the pressure and salinity, of the water is one of the determinants of the
velocity at which sound will travel. Varying temperatures of the water cause
a sound wave to refract, making it more difficult to detect. The various ther-
mal gradients of water can cause ducting (or trapping) of the sound wave at
particular depths. Therefore, to compensate for these disadvantages, more
allied SSNs will be needed for operations against Soviet SSNs and SSBNs in
the Arctic.
Whether or not these SSBNs would be withheld for escalation control,
intra-war deterrence or war termination can not be determined.
To make matters worse, it is believed that the Soviets have developed the
capability to fire their missiles through the Arctic ice. This is reportedly
153Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5.
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TABLE 5.2. SOVIET SSNS/SSBNS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1*4
SOYIET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
PLATFORM MISSILE WARHEADS RANGE
Yankee Class*




Yankee II SS-N-17 MODI One 3,900 KM
DeltaClass














Delta IV SS-N-23 Ten 8,300 KM
Typhoon Class
Typoon SS-N-20 Six-Nine 8,300 KM
3,000 KM.
•Special configured Yankees can aJso carry the
This missile's range i3 approximately 3,000 KM
5S-NX-21 Ion grange cruise missile.
154U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987, (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1987), 33-38.
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accomplished by "hardware, mounted on the submarine, that breaks through
several feet of ice above the submarine just prior to the missile launch." 155
Other technological advances are making operations in the region even
more attractive. Such advances include Extremely Low Frequency (ELF)
communications that have the "potential of providing world wide coverage at
any submarine depth,"156 satellite navigation fixes, and prepositioned "land-
marks" on the seafloor that can provide the Soviets with targeting and navi-
gation information without the aid of satellites. 157
The U.S. cannot let the Soviet Union's build-up of its Northern Fleet go
unchallenged. To date, Canada has done little in countering the Soviet
challenge in the Arctic. If the U.S. failed to take defensive actions in the
Arctic, it would basically become a Soviet lake from which the Soviets could
hold North America in its entirety as a hostage. For this reason, the U.S. has
an overriding security interest in the Arctic.
155Craig Covault, "Soviet Ability to Fire Through Ice Creates New SLBM Basing Mode,'
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 December 1984, 16.
156Ibid.,28.
157011ivant, Conflict Studies 172: Arctic Challenges toNato, 4.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Royal Canadian Navy's development patterns can be compared to the
floods and ebbs of the ocean tides. Canada demonstrated in World War II that
when the peace of the world is threatened and when time permits, it is quite
capable of assembling forces that can make a significant contribution to the
security of the free world. However, since World War II, weaponry and war-
fare have evolved to the point that technology no longer affords a country the
opportunity to rearm when confronted with a menacing situation. Therefore,
a continued state of readiness must be maintained to provide for security.
According to some Canadian officials and experts (cited in Chapter II),
Canada's armed forces are today incapable of meeting their obligations under
the various bilateral and multilateral agreements forged during and after
World War II. This sad state of affairs can be attributed to the Canadian
government's low level of spending on the armed forces. Among the 16 NATO
countries, Canada holds the position of fourteenth in military expenditures.
As a result, Canada has in recent decades settled for a naval force comparable
to that of some Third World countries.
Prime Minister Mulroney came to power in 1984 bent upon improving
Canada's military posture. Although it took three years to formulate its
defense policy paper, the Mulroney government has called for improvements
throughout the Canadian armed forces. Of prime naval importance is the
proposed procurement of 10 to 12 nuclear powered submarines at a cost of 8
billion dollars (Canadian) over 15 years. In view of Canada's historic austerity
in military expenditures, the proposed submarine plan is indeed an ambitious
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effort and accordingly, has drawn much criticism from the Canadian citi-
zenry, primarily because of the cost.
External criticism of Canada's submarine plan has principally come from
the United States, whose foremost concern is the intended use of the sub-
marines. Instead of the defense build-up being championed as Canada's
attempt to become a "team player" within NATO, some Canadians have
implied that the SSNs could serve as a means of enforcing Canada's
sovereignty vis-a-vis the U.S. in the Arctic.
The issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic has become a problem in
the friendly relations between Canada and the United States. Although it is
very questionable whether Canada can legally claim sovereignty over the
international waters in the region, it appears that Canadian policies could
hamper U.S. naval operations within the Arctic.
Although its origin goes back more than a hundred years, the issue of
U.S. encroachment upon Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic has been a
recurring theme since the 1969 transit of the Manhattan. This issue appears
to have reached new intensity after the 1985 transit of the U.S. Coast Guard
icebreaker Polar Sea (WAGB-11). Because previous passages of U.S. ships did
not receive the magnitude of publicity that the Polar Sea's transit received
and because of the two British Royal Navy submarines believed to have
transited the Arctic archipelago in May 1988, without much publicity, some
Canadians may be attempting to use the issue of sovereignty as a means of
building nationalism that will aid in securing approval for the proposed
defense spending plan. 158
158Toronto Globe and Mail, 31 May 1988, Al. Cited in the Contre for Foreign Policy
Students, Department of Political Sciences. Dalhousie University, Defense Newsletter 7, May
1988, 9.
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If, in fact, the issue of sovereignty is being used as a vehicle in furthering
their naval aspirations, the Canadians must be mindful of the mixed signals
they are sending to the world. On the one hand, Canada is calling for an
enhanced NATO posture; on the other hand, it is telling the Soviets that the
Western consensus on collective defense, the foundation of NATO, is begin-
ning to deteriorate. This dichotomous message could lead the Soviets to
conclude that there is friction within the NATO alliance.
While it may be in vogue to utilize the U.S. for domestic political pur-
posed in Canada, the U.S. remains the backbone of the Atlantic Alliance and
must be accorded the opportunity to fulfill its naval responsibilities. Without
the full participation of the United States, NATO would become an assort-
ment of middle powers whose collective naval strength would not even match
that of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Moreover, the continued condemnation of
the United States' naval operations in the Arctic by some Canadians "fans the
fires" of a growing U.S. domestic call for a retrenchment of U.S. forces.
If the U.S. were to relent on insisting on its right to passage in the Arctic,
it could have worldwide implications. The U.S. Navy has become the right
arm of U.S. foreign policy and deterrence strategy. To accomplish its respon-
sibilities, the U.S. Navy must have unimpeded passage throughout the
world's oceans. Should the U.S. set a precedent by negotiating its rights of
passage in the Arctic, other countries throughout the world would soon
demand similar concessions. 159
159Jonathan Manthorpe, "U.S. Denies Canada's Waterway Sovereignty" Defense News,
18 January 1988, 27.
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While the issue of Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago
remains unresolved, it would appear that the two governments could deter-
mine a workable provisional solution.
In January 1988, the U.S. and Canada signed the Arctic Cooperation
Agreement. This agreement acknowledged that both governments have a
shared interest in the Arctic region and called for their combined efforts in
matters of navigation and resource development. It further states that, "the
United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters
claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of
Canada."160 In essence, this agreement states that the U.S. will seek
Canada's permission before sending Coast Guard icebreakers through the
Northwest Passage. The agreement does not cover the passage of submarines,
however, In the interests of a united, cohesive front in the face of the Soviet
threat, Canada should take this agreement as a victory on the sovereignty
issue.
John Lamb, a spokesman for The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and
Disarmament, has stated that "It is a naive assumption that Canadian sub-
marines could compel the U.S. Navy to respect Canada's Arctic claims."
Instead Lamb said the acquisition of the submarines, "could result in a closer
and closer Canadian integration, as a junior partner, in U.S. naval operations
intheNorth."l6l
^^Agreement between the United States and Canada on Cooperation in the Arctic region.
January 1988.
161Cited in the TorontoGlobe and Mail, 11 May 88, A4. Cited in the Contre for Foreign
Policy Students, Department of Political Sciences. Dalhousie University, Defense Newsletter
7, May 1988, 17.
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Although Canada's first nuclear-powered submarine is not scheduled for
delivery until late 1996 and the program has formidable domestic obstacles to
overcome, U.S. defense planners must assume that this plan may become
reality and begin planning how the addition of 10 to 12 SSNs could best serve
the needs of NATO.
Because of the continued Soviet build-up in the region and the threat that
it poses to the security of North America, Captain LeSchack in his article,
"ComNavForArctic," called for the establishment of a U.S. Navy Unified
Command within the Arctic. 162 The author goes on to say that ComNav-
ForArctic "would be the focus for all Navy, naval aviation, and Marine Corps
operational, intelligence, and planning actions for any potential force projec-
tion in the Arctic theater." 163 An organization of this type would have merit;
but a U.S.-only operational concept would have an adverse impact upon
already somewhat strained U.S.—Canadian defense relations in the Arctic.
This writer believes that a more plausible organization would be one formed
along the lines ofNORAD-a combination of U.S. assets with the assets of
Canada. Canada might be inclined to put the sovereignty issue to rest if
Canadian co-responsibility for security operations was firmly established and
recognized.
For discussion purposes, this organization could be called the Unified
Command Arctic Theater (UCAT). UCAT could be a way of alleviating
Canada's concerns about sovereignty encroachment while, at the same time,




enhancing the security of North America and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.
In addition, it could be responsible for the joint planning and coordination of
operations in the Arctic region that would best serve the interests of North
America and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Moreover, this organization
could better integrate Canada's proposed 10 to 12 nuclear submarines into
NATO's maritime strategy in accomplishing its objectives of:
• Neutralizing Soviet Strategic Nuclear Submarines
• Safeguarding transatlantic sea lines
• Preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime superiority in the
North Atlantic. 164
Moreover, such an organization would enhance both the United States'
and Canada's ability to patrol the Arctic region. The 14 million square kilo-
meters of the Arctic provide ample area for both countries to make sizable
contributions to the security of North America. Since Canada has already
announced plans to establish a military facility at Manisivik, located on the
Northern shore of Baffin Bay, 165 basing for this organization could be estab-
lished, thereby reducing U.S. transit times to and from the Arctic region and
increasing the SSNs' time on station before returning to homeport. The
obvious benefit of this basing is that the Western presence in the Arctic would
be increased, making it more difficult for Soviet submarines to avoid
detection.
164Michael N. Pocalyko, "Sinking Soviet SSBNs," Proceedings, October 1987, p.26.
165Jonathan Manthrope, "Canada Sets Base Near Northwest Passage," Defense News, 15
February 1988.
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The U.S. currently has 37 Sturgeon (SSN-637) class submarines capable
of operating under the Arctic ice. The SSN-637 class is rapidly reaching the
age of retirement. Of the 67 new Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines
currently in operation or being built, only 34 will be capable of operating
under the Arctic ice.166 The U.S. Navy had hoped to procure a new SSN-21
class submarine designed especially for under-the-ice operations; however,
current budgetary considerations may delay procurement of the SSN-21 well
into the next century. Moreover, during a time of crisis U.S. SSNs would be
required for operations against other Soviet forces as well as to serve in the
defense of U.S. SLOCs to Western Europe. Ten (10) to 12 Canadian SSNs
should therefore be a welcome addition to collective security.
The benefit for Canada in joining UCAT is that the Canadians could
receive advanced ASW technology and training from the United States.
Because Canadian forces would be serving in a capacity that directly affects
the security of the United States, it is possible that the U.S. might make
available certain types of advanced technology for the detection of sub-
marines. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) is currently working with data relay satellites for Unking small
sensors on the ice pack with U.S. ground stations and submarines. It is
expected that this sensor system will be able to "...take advantage of proper-
ties of the ice pack that are especially favorable for submarine detection." 167
While Canada's experience in operating under the ice is very limited, joint
166Edward B. Atkeson, "Fighting Subs Under the Ice" Proceedings, September 1987, 83.
167ibid.
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operations with the U.S. would serve as a vehicle for teaching Canada the
"tricks of the trade."
The Soviet threat from the Arctic is real and not imaginary. In the inter-
ests of security, Western nations must do all they can to deny the Soviets
their objectives in this region. Unfortunately, dissension among the Western
allies has continued, partly because of disagreements about how to assess and
respond to Gorbachev's calls for reductions in forces and other measures
relating to the Arctic.
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APPENDIX A
CANADA'S ECONOMIC MEASUREMENTS AND EXPENDITURES 1*^
CANADA
YEAR MEGNP MECGE MECAP GNPCON MECON CGECON
1967 3.0 18.7 246.9 169167.2 5037.4 26968.7
1968 2.7 16.3 231.1 178950.6 1896.7 29347.6
1969 2.4 11.6 215.2 188567.9 1882.7 39045.6
1970 2.4 12.9 220 193387.8 2057.9 36350.6
1971 2.3 10.7 217.6 206750.5 2174.6 43783.5
1972 2.1 10.5 215.5 219244.7 2266.9 44749.8
1973 2.0 9.7 209.1 235756.7 2356.2 47408.1
1974 2.0 8.5 212.6 243820.1 2640.2 55886.8
1975 1.9 7.7 206.9 246505.3 2840.2 60978.8
1976 1.9 8.2 214.4 260462.5 3150.5 60464.0
1977 2.0 8.7 226.7 265554.2 3574.1 61036.4
1978 2.0 8.7 238.7 275079.3 4076.7 64491.6
1979 1.9 8.2 221.5 283174.6 4136.8 63941.3
1980 1.9 8.1 225.1 283027.1 4638.1 67015.0
1981 1.9 7.8 229.9 291765.7 5265.7 71988.7
1982 2.2 8.1 252.2 278873.6 6203.4 76213.9
1983 2.2 7.8 248.1 287239.9 6439.2 79381.0
iG&The data used in this chart was extracted from the program 'USACDA WMEAT
DATA 1967-1983. 'Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 3033/4381. This data was extracted from
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's yearly publication, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. MEGNP and MECGE are in percentages. All
other columns are in (U.S.) millions of dollars.
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APPENDIX B
MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF NATO MEMBERS WITH
A HIGH ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION. 168
YEAR
BELGIUM DENMARK FRANCE
MECON | MECGE MECON | MECGE MECON MECGE
1967 1635.4 15.2 1030.6 10.9 16006 26.2
1968 1694.3 14.6 1107.9 10.7 16068.7 25.3
1969 1699.6 13.8 1057.2 9.8 15292.6 21.4
1970 1799.4 7.9 1021.5 7.1 15410.9 1 1.7
1971 1860.9 7.6 1097.3 7.2 15568.3 1 1.8
1972 1956.2 7.2 1066.7 6.8 15955.6 1 1.5
1973 2049.9 7.1 1004.0 6.4 16476 11.6
1974 2091.2 7.0 1127.8 6.5 16786.1 10.6
1975 2271.3 6.8 1189.8 6.7 17274.3 10.1
1976 2428.6 6.7 1177.8 6.5 17983.5 9.9
1977 2497.1 6.6 1208.6 6.4 19052.6 10.2
1978 2673.3 6.6 1252.1 6.3 20081.3 10.2
1979 2737.8 6.5 1452.6 6.9 20642.7 9.9
1980 2852.6 6.5 1340.3 6.0 21411.2 10.0
1981 2944.0 6.2 1365.9 5.7 22206.6 9.7
1982 2891.8 5.8 1400.5 5.5 22523 9.0
1983 2793.2 5.7 1421.9 4.5 22827.8 9.3
168The USACDA WMEAT Data base assign four general classifications to countries
based on their per capita GNP: HIGH (GNPCAP>$5000), LOW (GNPCAP<$400), LOW
MEDIUM (GNPCAP< $1600), and UPPER MEDIUM (GNPCAP<$5000). The countries used




MECON | MECGE| MECON MECGE| MECON MECGE
1967 24.0 0.0 3272.7 8.7 1144.1 11.7
1968 20.6 0.0 3219.5 8.0 1201.7 11.9
1969 20.4 0.0 3396.2 8.0 1254.6 11.2
1970 19.6 2.5 3415.5 7.7 1233 10.3
1971 21.0 2.4 3537.8 7.2 1259.2 9.2
1972 23.3 2.4 3594.8 7.2 1285.3 8.4
1973 24.6 2.4 3638.4 6.9 1273.9 8.0
1974 24.6 2.3 3814.8 6.8 1298.2 7.8
1975 29.3 2.2 3975.0 6.5 1429.3 7.9
1976 30.6 2.2 3928.9 6.1 1472.4 7.0
1977 31.5 2.1 4384.9 6.6 1519.8 6.8
1978 33.5 2.2 4192.9 6.0 1649.6 7.1
1979 34.0 2.1 4447.9 6.1 1661.9 6.8
1980 39.1 2.4 4377.9 5.7 1627.8 6.7
1981 40.5 2.4 4469.7 5.6 1628.6 7.0
1982 41.4 2.3 4464.8 5.5 1697.6 7.2
1983 42.5 2.6 4483.8 5.5 1769.8 10.1
YEAR
UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM WEST GERMANY
MECON MECGE MECON | MECGE MECON MECGE
1967 199686.1 48.7 20617.7 18.6 18072.8 34.2
1968 203644.5 46.9 20305.4 17.0 16015.8 28.6
1969 195461.4 44.1 19007.4 16.0 17292.1 28.3
1970 177252.3 39.8 18802.8 13.5 16860.4 14.2
1971 16181 1.5 35.2 19815.9 13.7 17643.9 14.1
1972 160881.6 33.4 21180.8 14.1 18861.0 14.2
1973 153697.7 30.1 21321.8 13.7 19766.2 13.9
1974 154948.2 30.3 21952.7 12.5 20658.8 13.4
1975 155148.7 23.3 21483.9 11.3 20412.1 12.1
1976 142425.4 23.6 22236.5 11.9 20469.2 11.7
1977 149170.7 28.8 21663.5 12.2 20367.1 11.3
1978 150346.4 23.0 21841.6 11.7 21003.9 11.4
1979 155148.7 23.3 22499.1 11.7 21373.9 11.2
1980 167680.5 23.1 24123.1 12.1 21786.4 10.7
1981 180985.3 23.6 22710.4 11.5 22529.7 10.7
1982 196390.0 25.0 24169.3 11.6 22346.1 10.6
1983 208337.8 25.4 26330.5 13.2 22608.9 10.7
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